Resources on the Challenger Space Disaster
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Annotated Bibliography Resources on the Challenger Space Disaster |
| The Challenger spacecraft was launched on January 28, 1986, and exploded 73 seconds after liftoff. Much of the research into what went wrong with the Challenger launch focuses on the lack of communication between NASA, Morton Thiokol, Inc. (MTI) and the Marshall Space Center. An important factor in the communications failure was the relationship between these three organizations. MTI was the contractor responsible for the component that failed during the launch and depended on Marshall for the contract, and Marshall depended on NASA for funding and support. |
Almost two years before the fatal launch, MTI became aware that there could be a problem with the O-ring, a sealing component that prevents hot gases from escaping the solid rocket booster and burning a hole in the fuel tank (the physical cause of the Challenger disaster). The engineers at MTI documented this problem and insisted that further testing needed to be done to determine the reliability of the O-ring. Upon further testing they confirmed that the O-ring was not reliable, particularly when temperatures dropped below 53º. Why then was the Challenger given the go to launch on January 28, 1986 when the temperature at launch time was 36º, well below the safety margin?
This research will examine the causes behind the communication breakdown that led to the fatal launch. The discussion will center on the responsibility of an individual to turn knowledge into accepted facts. There is a difference between writing facts down on paper and having those facts accepted as truths. Writers must be aware that what they write is subject to interpretation and interpretations are subject to corporate culture and pressures from outside sources. Key questions this research will answer are: How is the written word transformed into accepted knowledge? Is a writer responsible for the interpretation or misinterpretation of the facts he presents? What are the ethical implications of accepting or rejecting the written word? How is pressure exerted to conform to corporate culture?
Winsor, Dorothy A. "The Construction of Knowledge in Organizations: Asking the Right Questions about the Challenger" Journal of Business and Technical Communication, v4n2 September 1990: 7-20.
Winsor investigates the difference between "knowing and passing on the information". She claims that knowing something is not enough, if you have the facts, you cannot assume that just writing the facts down will transfer your knowledge to your audience. Audiences vary in their assumptions so evidence that is valid for one group may have no validity for another. The opposing sides in the Challenger disaster both argued facts to support their decision. The managers who gave the go to launch argued that the 24 launches prior to the challenger all returned safely which convinced them that the O-rings functioned properly. They were not proven wrong until the Challenger exploded. The engineers written word failed to transform facts into knowledge which resulted in the explosion. Winsor’s article examines the reasons facts are not accepted as knowledge.
… "Communication Failures Contributing to the Challenger Accident: An Example for Technical communications" Transactions on Professional Communication, v31n3, September 1988:101-107.
Winsor explores the movement of communications within organizations. After examining the documents relating to the disaster she attributed miscommunication as the leading factor in the disaster. The miscommunication is a result of managers and engineers viewing the same facts from different viewpoints. Shared interpretation of facts is more likely if the sender and receiver share the same corporate role. Reaching the same interpretations is more difficult if the sender and receiver are from different subcultures as is the case in the Challenger disaster. Along with this she states that bad news generally does not travel up the corporate ladder too well. When bad news is sent upward it is less likely to be believed than good news. And lastly, organizations tend not to air "dirty linen" in public. This article looks at the pressures writers face while communicating negative facts upward and how difficult it is to change an accepted viewpoint.
Walzer, Arthur E. and Gross, Alan. "Positivists, postmodernists, Aristotelians, and the Challenger disaster" College English, v56n4 April 1994: 420-433.
Walzer and Gross analyze the Challenger disaster from three different viewpoints – positivists, postmodernist and Aristotelian. They state that since the reliability of the O-ring was questioned on the eve of the launch, the disaster resulted "from a failure of the managers and engineers to reach the best decisions on the eve of the launch". They use the three approaches to look at the different ways that facts are transferred into knowledge and state conclusions that are reached by each approach. The positivists believe that facts are facts and speak for themselves. The engineers had genuine knowledge that the O-ring was unreliable, therefore the disaster resulted from ethical misconduct or a breakdown in communication, e.g. poorly written memos, selective listening, or misdirection of information. The postmodernists agree with Winsor in that facts do not speak for themselves. Facts are subject to interpretation and only count as knowledge when the interpretation has been accepted by the interpretive community. This viewpoint supports the decision made by the managers. The Aristotelian approach is to look for the best reasons for assent or desent and the best reasons for decisions and actions, particularly when there is an absence of consent. The managers and engineers should have first debated the facts presented and if no agreement could be reached on the facts, then the ethical issues should have been debated. The best decision was not reached because only the scientific issues were debated, not the ethical implications. Like Winsor, this article looks at different ways of interpreting facts and the effects of the interpretations.
Moore, Patrick; Louise M. Rosenblatt, "Two comments on ‘Positivists, postmodernists, Aristotelians, and the challenger disaster’" College English, v57n3, March 1995: 349-357.
Moore and Rosenblatt argue that the Aristotelian approach was not an option in the debate on whether or not to launch the Challenger. They claim that the engineers had subordinate roles and knew the hierarchical power of NASA would force them to "fall silent and yield to the decisions of NASA". This article examines the pressures involved when a hierarchical structure exists. The hierarchical power dominates and controls the interpretation of facts.
Dombrowski, Paul M. "The Lessons of the Challenger Investigations" Transactions on Professional Communications, v34n4, December 1991: 211-215.
Dombrowski agrees with Winsor in that communication is subject to interpretation – he calls it socially contingent. Every communication should consider human action, motives and assumptions rather than only material, objective entities. He sites engineering reports and judgements as being "undone by reconceptualizations which engineers were not party to and were powerless to alter". The abnormalities discovered in the O-rings were eventually accepted as commonplace because the charring happened so often. He states that the lesson for professional communication is this: not the object itself (the charring), but the meaning attached to the object was all important as a condition for continued flight. The technical reports were correct, the people who interpreted the reports used faulty judgements. Writers need to be aware of the human element in conveying facts as knowledge.
… "Can Ethics Be Technologized? Lessons from the Challenger, Philosophy and Rhetoric" Transactions on Professional Communication, v38n3 September 1995: 146-150.
Dombrowski expands upon his first article saying that technical knowledge does not automatically translate to its own ethicality. The human act of conceptualizing and interpreting data is basis for ethical responsibility. He again uses the O-ring charring interpretation to support his theory. The charring went from a major concern to "acceptable erosion", "allowable erosion" and "acceptable risk". The technical data was there but could not be relied upon to tell its own story and could not guide ethical conduct. MTI engineers were very concerned about the O-ring situation, but NASA management was more concerned about postponing a flight that was already behind schedule. The decision to launch was determined not by technical information, but by the prior interpretive framework that management chose to adopt. Dombrowski agrees with Walzer stating that rhetoric is a vital communicative means by which ethics is both revealed and practiced – it would not allow people to forsake their ethical responsibility for a set of rules that could make decisions for them. He further states that ethical responsibility or lack of should have been brought to light by the Rogers commission which investigated the Challenger disaster. Clearly flawed judgement was used in launching the challenger, but the commission refers to "flawed procedures" and difficulties with the "communication system" as the contributing reason for the disaster. This article once again proves that facts do not speak for themselves.
Boisjoly, Russell P. et.al. "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions" Journal of Business Ethics, v8 1989: 217-230.
Russell Boisjoly was an engineer for MTI. He was considered the O-ring expert at MTI and was also the main opponent to the launch after his research validated that O-ring was unreliable. His conclusions are the same as Winsor’s in that the hierarchical structure and the social culture within the organizations contributed to the fatal decision to launch the Challenger. Boisjoly takes his observations one step further – he feels that management hides behind a groupthink process. In a group decision no one individual has to take responsibility for their actions. Boisjoly had written memos to enlist support in his crusade to accept the facts he discovered in his empirical observations. Management basically ignored him. Their groupthink decision was already made. At the Roger Commission hearings, the managers stated that they did not understand the reports that reported the problems with the O-rings. Boisjoly feels that ignorance is not an acceptable explanation for allowing the launch to proceed. He contends that systems should be in place to make individuals responsible for their decisions even if the decisions are the result of groupthink. This is especially true for managers who become "instruments of their own ignorance whenever they prevent the free and complete flow of information to themselves, wither directly by their acts, or indirectly through the subtle messages they convey to their subordinates, in their management style or by the organizational climate they help to create". Boisjoly’s article explores the responsibility of making decisions, stressing the importance of each individual to think of themselves apart from a group or organization. Each individual has a responsibility, being part of an organization does not relieve you from the consequences of your decision.
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Links to Challenger Sites Boisjoly site: Rogers Commission Report: Presidential Commission Report on Space Shuttle Challenger Accident |